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JAPAN’S GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
REGIMES FOR PUBLIC WORKS:
A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION
Shigeki Kusunoki *

I

ABSTRACT

n Japan, the Act for Promoting Quality Assurance in Public
Works was enacted in spring 2005 and came into force soon
thereafter. This is an epoch-making act in the history of Japanese public procurement regimes and practices, mainly in that, with respect to
bidding procedures: (1) it declares that a comprehensive evaluation
method shall generally be used for public works; (2) it permits procuring entities to dialogue with candidates to discuss improvement of their
submitted technical proposals; and (3) it permits a cap on the estimated
price to be set just before the scheduled date of bidding. The author
will introduce Japan’s basic public procurement regimes and the Act’s
impact on them, and describe Japan vis-à-vis the United States, European Union, and the Government Procurement Agreement of the
World Trade Organization (WTO-GPA or GPA) on the issue of contractor award processes. The hurdles for implementing the WTO-GPA
that Japan has to overcome will be addressed in the concluding remarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the result of the negotiations of the Uruguay Round for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as simultaneous
multilateral trade negotiations, the Government Procurement Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 1 was signed in Marrakech, Morocco in 1994 and came into effect in January 1996. 2 In December 1995, just before it came into force, Japan ratified and then
promulgated the Agreement. 3

* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Sophia University. The author thanks the
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for its financial support.
1. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), Legal Instruments—Results
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GPA], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf.
See
generally
SUE
ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO (2003) (discussing the GPA).
2. GPA, supra note 1, art. 24(1); ARROWSMITH, supra note 1, at 40.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Notice on the GATT Agreement on Government
Procurement, Notice No. 665 (Dec. 8, 1995) (effective from Jan. 1, 1996).
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Ten years have passed since the GPA entered into force. Until today,
the member countries, as well as observers like China, have reformed
their domestic government procurement regimes in an attempt to implement the GPA. 4 Among them, Japan has grappled with many reforms and measures, including ones to tighten up the conditions for
awards in cases of non-competitive tendering (single-source tendering) 5 and to establish bid-protest institutions. 6
Remarkably, as in other member and observer countries, not only the
need to implement the GPA to fulfill international treaty obligations,
but also particular domestic considerations, provided the impetus for
Japan’s recent legal and practical reforms with respect to public procurement. Specifically, the reforms in Japan needed to address not only
the country’s GPA obligations but also the country’s specific institutional, historical, cultural, and social conditions, such as the group
mentality deeply rooted in Japanese culture which has resulted in
bid-rigging problems 7 as well as the involvement of government officials in the majority of bid-rigging cases. 8
As a starting point to address these obligations and specific conditions in Japan, the Act for Promoting Quality Assurance in Public
Works (APQA) was enacted in spring 2005. 9 Although the immediate
effect of this important Act is limited as it covers only public works, it
has the strong potential to be a breakthrough for the necessary reform
of Japanese public procurement laws, regulations, and practices in
general. Among its most notable provisions, the Act provides that the
4. See, e.g., Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence and Opportunity:
The WTO Government Procurement Agreement and U.S. Procurement Reform, 18
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303 (1999) (discussing reforms in U.S. law to implement the GPA); Tong Xinchao, Chinese Procurement Law: Current Legal
Framework and a Transition to the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 139 (2003) (discussing China’s
efforts to bring its procurement laws more in line with the GPA).
5. See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, Japan’s Implementation of the WTO Agreement
on Government Procurement, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 631–33 (1996).
6. Id. at 643–56.
7. See, e.g., Guy de Jonquieres, Take a Bite Out of Japan's Collusion Culture, FIN.
TIMES, May 31, 2005, at 17.
8. Regarding recent cases government officials involved in bid-rigging cases, see,
e.g., Bid-rigging Attitudes See Shift, YOMIURI SHIMBUN [DAILY YOMIURI] (Tokyo),
Dec. 10, 2006, at 3.
9. Kokyokōji no hinshitsu kakuho no sokushin ni kansuru hōritsu [Act for Promoting Quality Assurance in Public Works], Law No. 18 of 2005 [hereinafter APQA].
An English translation is available at the Web site of the Japanese Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport, http://www.hrr.mlit.go.jp/gijyutu/hinkaku/html/hou-eng
lish.html.
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“comprehensive evaluation” method, and not the “price-only competition” method, is to be generally employed; 10 procuring entities and
candidates may discuss and make adjustments to the technical proposals in competitive bidding procedures; 11 and the “maximum estimated
price” usually set at the time of a bidding announcement may be set by
procuring entities just before the date of bidding. 12 Until the end of the
last century, the main aims of reforming public works regimes were to
enhance competitiveness and to deter misconduct, responding to criticism against the frequent cases of bid rigging and bribery in the 1990s.
After the enactment of the APQA, however, the movement for Japan’s
procurement reforms could be boldly steered toward “flexibility” and
“diversification.” 13
This article aims at providing detailed information concerning the
developments in Japan described above. It is hoped that this article will
be useful to readers in deepening their understanding of Japan, and
thereby contribute to smooth negotiations among WTO members.
Moreover, it is hoped that the article will also be of use to academics
and legal practitioners as a comparative analysis of laws and policies.
Hereafter, Part II surveys and highlights the basic legal schemes for
government procurement in Japan. Part III introduces the APQA and
its legislative history. Next, Part IV compares the relevant laws in Japan, the United States, and the European Union, and discusses the anticipated hurdles that Japan must overcome to implement the GPA
fully. Finally, Part V contains the author’s conclusion.
II. CONTRACTOR SELECTION PROCESSES IN JAPAN’S PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT
Generally speaking, there are two types of administrative agencies
that handle government procurement, namely national agencies and
local agencies. In Japan, different laws and regulations apply to the
two types of administrative agencies. National agencies are regulated
by the Accounting Act (AA) 14 and its implementing Order Concerning

10. Id. art. 3; see infra Part III.B.3.
11. APQA, supra note 9, art. 13; see infra Part III.B.6.
12. APQA, supra note 9, art. 14; see infra Part III.B.7.
13. It is difficult to understand the meaning and impact of this legislation without
knowledge of the Japanese laws and regulations concerning public accounts, including
the basic provisions for public procurement procedures. These laws and regulations
will be explained in Part II of this article.
14. Kaikeihō [Accounting Act], Law No. 35 of 1947 [hereinafter AA].

526

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 32:2

Budget, Auditing and Accounting (OBAA), 15 and local agencies are
regulated by the Local Autonomy Act 16 and its implementing Order
Concerning Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act. 17 However,
these two sets of acts and orders are similar with respect to their basic
framework for contractor selection processes. Therefore, this article
will hereafter highlight only the main points of the legal provisions
regulating national agencies and will mention the local agencies’ regulations only when there is no equivalent for national agencies.
A. Contractor Selection Procedures
First, there is a set of rules concerning whether an award is to be
made to a contractor through a competitive selection procedure, and if
so, how competitive the process will be. This is the famous classification distinguishing “open competitive tendering,” “designated competitive tendering,” and “non-competitive (single-source) tendering.”
Open competitive tendering is a procedure in which any qualified
person may submit a tender. This is the general procedure provided in
the relevant acts and orders, regardless whether national or local. 18
However, this procedure does not mean that anyone may unconditionally take part in the bidding process. Laws and regulations obligate
procuring entities to exclude from such process persons falling into
certain categories 19 and allow procuring entities to do so in certain
cases. 20 Moreover, chief executives of procuring entities may from the
outset impose conditions of qualification for participation in particular
bidding procedures. 21
Designated competitive tendering and non-competitive tendering
may be used only if the conditions prescribed by the relevant laws and
15. Yosan kessan oyobi kaikeirei [Order Concerning Budget, Auditing and Accounting], Imperial Edict No. 165 of 1947 [hereinafter OBAA].
16. Chiho Jichihō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947.
17. Chiho jichihō Sekōrei [Order Concerning Enforcement of the Local Autonomy
Act], Cabinet Order No. 16 of 1947.
18. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3).
19. See, e.g., id. art. 29(3)(2); OBAA, supra note 15, art. 70 (providing, inter alia,
for the exclusion of a person who is incompetent to contract and a bankrupt without
any possibility of reinstatement).
20. See, e.g., AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(2); OBAA, supra note 15, art. 71
(providing, inter alia, that procuring entities may bar persons who are found to have
violated the Anti-Monopoly Act from competitive bidding for a maximum period of
two years).
21. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 72(1). These rules apply to designated competitive
tendering. Id. art. 95. Open competitive tendering with these restrictions is called
“conditional open competitive tendering.”
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regulations are met. Designated competitive tendering is a procedure in
which only persons invited (i.e., designated) by the procuring entities
may submit a tender. 22 Designated competitive tendering may be used
only in the following cases: (1) when, due to the nature or purpose of
the contract, only a small number of operators are expected to participate in competitive bidding and the use of open competitive tendering
is not necessary; (2) when, due to the nature or purpose of the contract,
the use of open competitive tendering is deemed to be disadvantageous; 23 (3) when the estimated contract price is lower than the
threshold level; or (4) in other cases where the order so provides. 24
Non-competitive tendering is a procedure other than the two competitive tendering procedures previously described. Typically, procuring entities using this procedure contact targeted operators individually, negotiate with them to calculate the estimated expenses to be
submitted to the agency, and enter into a contract.
Non-competitive tendering may be used only in the following cases:
(1) when the nature or purpose of the contract prohibits competition; 25
(2) when it is not possible to use a competitive selection method because of extreme urgency; 26 (3) when the use of competitive tendering
is deemed to be disadvantageous; 27 (4) when the estimated contract
price is lower than the threshold level; 28 or (5) in other cases where the
order so provides. 29
Further, the relevant laws and regulations require procuring entities
to select contractors as competitively as possible even in cases where
the entities use designated competitive tendering or non-competitive
tendering. That is, in designated competitive tendering cases, procuring
22. See id. art. 94.
23. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(3) (providing for (1) and (2) above). An example
of a case where the use of open competitive tendering is deemed to be disadvantageous
is one where a “breach of contract will cause significant trouble to a government
project.” OBAA, supra note 15, art. 104-4.
24. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(5) (providing for (3) and (4) above). Article 94(1)
of the OBAA specifies threshold levels for each procured object. OBAA, supra note
15, art. 94(1).
25. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(4).
26. Id.
27. Id. An example of a case where “the use of competition is deemed to be disadvantageous” is one where “if an agency did not contract urgently, it would probably
lose the chance to contract or it would be forced to contract at a significantly disadvantageous price.” OBAA, supra note 15, art. 104-4.
28. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(4).
29. Id. art. 29(3)(5). Article 99 of the OBAA prescribes the cases where this procedure can be used, e.g., “the case where the government activity at issue needs to be
kept secret.” OBAA, supra note 15, art. 99.
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entities should designate at least ten operators if possible, 30 and in
non-competitive tendering cases, procuring entities should collect
written estimates from at least two operators if possible. 31
B. The “Price-Only Competition” Method and the “Comprehensive
Evaluation” Method
The issue of which type of contractor selection procedure a procuring entity should use, discussed in the previous section, can be said to
be an issue concerning whether the selection process is “competitive”
or not and how competitive it is, whereas the distinction between the
price-only competition method and the comprehensive evaluation
method relates to what candidates compete over, that is, the “factors of
competition.” First, the price-only competition method can generally
be described as a method in which the bidder offering the lowest price
will receive the award. 32 Under the law, this method should be used in
principle if a procuring entity uses a competitive tendering procedure,
regardless whether it is “open” or “designated.” 33 In contrast, the
comprehensive evaluation method can be described roughly as a
method where not only price but also other conditions such as quality,
techniques, or skills are to be considered in the aggregate and the most
advantageous candidate will be awarded the contract when a procuring
entity selects a contractor. Under the law, this method should be used
exceptionally, that is, only when certain conditions are met. 34
As will be mentioned later, the latter method is not considered exceptional in the U.S. or the E.U., whereas it is so considered in Japan.
This exceptional treatment is emphatically reflected by the provision
stating that “[m]inisters or chiefs of departments or agencies should
consult with the Minister of the Department of Finance” when they
wish to use this method. 35
30. Id. art. 97(1).
31. Id. art. 99(6).
32. See AA, supra note 14, art. 29(6)(1).
33. Id.
34. Id. art. 29(6)(2).
35. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 91(2). This “consultation” requirement was originally interpreted as requiring individual consultation for each procurement item, so the
comprehensive evaluation method was seldom used. Later, the competent ministries
and the Minister of the Department of Finance agreed that this requirement should be
interpreted as not demanding individual consultation as long as there was a comprehensive agreement through comprehensive consultation and they applied this revised
interpretation to public works. Thereafter, the “Guidelines for the Comprehensive
Evaluation Method in Public Works” were released in 2000. Now, as long as the case
falls within the purview of these guidelines, there is no need for consultation. This fact
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C. Maximum Estimated Price
A specific characteristic of Japan’s scheme for selection of public
works contractors in comparison with other countries is the existence
of an upper-limit “estimated price” over which a bid is deemed invalid
and a government procuring entity may not contract. This is very strict
and there is no exception. 36 This limitation is commonly applied regardless of the type of contractor selection procedure. 37
Under the law, a procuring entity shall estimate the bidding price or
the contract price of the item at issue in accordance with its design and
other specifications and other relevant characteristics, 38 and the estimated price shall be properly calculated through consideration of such
relevant factors as actual market prices, the situation of supply and
demand, the ease or difficulty of execution, the quantity, and the length
of time necessary for execution. 39 This estimated price is generally
characterized as “just an estimated cost calculated in advance.” This
characterization in itself is not the basis for the maximum nature of the
estimated price. It could be based largely on the government’s own
ideas regarding the governmental budget and disbursement.
While the maximum estimated price eliminates prices that are too
high, there are also schemes that forestall prices that are too low. The
law allows a procuring entity to exclude a candidate whose bidding
price is deemed to be so low that the contract might not be executed
properly or that the contract would be considered improper because it
is likely to disturb the order of fair trade. 40 In such a case, a procuring

is indeed one of the reasons for the recent increase in the number of cases using the
comprehensive evaluation method. The exceptional nature of this method is further
illustrated by Article 167-10-2(4) of the Order Concerning Enforcement of the Local
Autonomy Act that provides that “procuring agencies shall consult with well-informed
persons in advance” when the comprehensive evaluation method is used. Order Concerning Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act, supra note 17, art. 167-10-2(4).
About all of the above, see Shigeki Kusunoki, Nyusatsudango ni taisuru shobatsu ni
yoru kaiketsu to soreigaino kaiketsu [How Effective Are the Sanctions Under the
Japanese Legislation and Regulations Governing Public Procurement to Address the
Problem of Bid Rigging?], 40 SANDAI HOGAKU 1, 16 (2006) (Japan).
36. In the case of an auction, a minimum price limit will be set. AA, supra note 14,
art. 29-6(1). As this issue is outside the scope of this article, a precise explanation is
omitted.
37. Id. art. 26(6) (prescribing the estimated price for open competitive tendering
and designated competitive tendering); OBAA, supra note 15, art. 99-5 (prescribing
the estimated price for non-competitive tendering).
38. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 79.
39. Id. art. 80(2).
40. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(6)(1).
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entity has an obligation to investigate the relevant facts. 41 Moreover, as
far as local governments are concerned, a minimum price limitation
may be set. 42
D. Secondary Policies
The Act on Ensuring the Receipt of Orders from the Government and
Other Public Agencies by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises” 43
(Public Agency Order Act or PAOA) was enacted in 1966 to implement the aims of the Basic Act Concerning Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises. 44 As the full name of the Act itself reflects, the Public
Agency Order Act aims to enhance development of small and medium-sized enterprises by ensuring procurement by public agencies
from them through measures to expand opportunities for such enterprises to receive orders. 45 This Act, composed of only seven articles,
has long influenced Japanese public procurement practices.
The Public Agency Order Act provides that the government and
other public agencies “shall make efforts to expand opportunities for
the receipt of orders by small and medium-sized enterprises, while
giving due consideration to the proper execution of the budget” when
public contracts are concluded. 46 The Act further provides that, as
means to carry out these obligations, each year (1) the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry shall, through consultation with the
ministers and heads of other competent ministries and agencies, draft
guidelines to expand opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises to receive orders, taking into consideration the budget and project plans for the year; 47 (2) the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry shall request approval by the Cabinet of the guidelines; 48 (3) the
heads of each of the relevant ministries and agencies shall report their
41. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 86(1).
42. Order Concerning Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act, supra note 17, art.
167-10(2).
43. Kankōju ni tsuiteno chūshō kigyōsha no juchū no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu
[Act on Ensuring the Receipt of Orders from the Government and Other Public Agencies by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises], Law No. 97 of 1966 [hereinafter Public
Agency Order Act (PAOA)].
44. Chūshō kigyō kihonhō [Basic Act Concerning Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises], Law No. 154 of 1963, art. 20 (providing that the government shall take
necessary measures to ensure proper trade by small and medium-sized enterprises).
45. PAOA, supra note 43, art. 1.
46. Id. art. 3. Article 2 of this Act defines “small and medium enterprises.” Id. art.
2.
47. Id. art. 4(1)–(2).
48. Id. art. 4(2).
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achievements of contracts with small and medium-sized enterprises to
the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry after the end of the fiscal
or business year; 49 and (4) local self-governing bodies, applying national policies, shall endeavor to take actions to ensure opportunities
for the receipt of orders by small and medium-sized enterprises. 50
In practice, government procuring entities have tried either to enhance small and medium-sized enterprises’ entrance into the public
procurement market by dividing works into smaller categories or dividing orders into smaller lots in order to make the contract price low
enough, 51 or to expand the receipt of orders by small and medium-sized enterprises through the use of designated competitive tendering or non-competitive tendering. 52 In national procurement, small
and medium-sized enterprises have received roughly forty to fifty percent of the total amount of governmental contracts during the past
decade. 53
E. Practices to Adjust Opportunities Through “Designation:” Advantages and Disadvantages
The Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization
and Maintenance of Fair Trade 54 (Anti-Monopoly Act)—the equivalent of antitrust law in the United States or competition law in the
European Union—was not actively enforced for a long time between
its enactment in 1947 and the end of the 1980s. Many regulations limited newcomers’ entry into many business fields such as transportation,
electricity, and the media. This demonstrates that competition was not
a basis of Japanese economic management. 55
49. Id. art. 5.
50. Id. art. 7.
51. See, e.g., Jichitai ha kansei dango no ne wo tachikire [Local Governments
Must Root Out Bid-Rigging with the Involvement of Government Officials], NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Dec. 3, 2006 (Morning Ed.), at 2.
52. See id.
53. Statistics are available at the Web site of the Small and Medium Enterprise
Agency, http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/koukai/shingikai/download/kankoju_matome
_sankou.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
54. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu
[Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of
Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947.
55. Some commentators point out that Japanese tend to prefer “cooperation” rather
than “competition” based on their cultural background. See, e.g., THE JAPANESE MIND:
UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE CULTURE 195–97 (Roger J. Davies &
Osamu Ikeno eds., 2002); YOSHIO SUGIMOTO, AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE
SOCIETY (CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE SOCIETY) (2d ed. 2003).

532

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 32:2

Japanese public procurement was not managed competitively either.
As already stated in Section A of this Part, open competitive tendering
is now adopted as a general rule. Until a decade ago, however, the majority of contractor selection procedures used designated competitive
tendering. 56 Generally speaking, three reasons can be cited for this.
First, it is advantageous if procuring entities can exclude improper
candidates from contractor selection procedures through their designation. 57 Second, designated competitive tendering is an effective way to
implement the Public Agency Order Act. 58 Third, there are paternalistic demands on the government to adopt designated competitive tendering to assure long-term stable profits for a limited number of companies which are expected to supply high-quality items or works. 59
As to the third reason, assurance of companies’ long-term stable
profits can be achieved not only through the use of designated competitive tendering, but also through a system of adjustment or distribution of profits, that is, bid rigging. The adoption of designated competitive tendering encourages candidates to engage in bid rigging because the number of candidates is limited through the designation, the
list of designated candidates can frequently be fixed, and candidates
can collude more easily. 60 Moreover, in many cases, procuring entities
tacitly permit and sometimes actively get involved in bid rigging. 61
Many commentators informally contend that competition is restrained
by bid rigging in most procurement cases in Japan. 62 Naturally, this
anti-competitive characteristic of public procurement has supported a
cozy relationship among politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspersons
for a long time. 63

56. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, Japan: Policy Developments Affecting Trade and
Investment, WT/TPR/S/32 (Jan. 5, 1998) (stating that selective tendering had been a
“previously
pervasive”
procedure),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/japan.pdf.
57. See, e.g., Yasushi Ohno, Kokyokōji ni okeru nyusatsu keiyaku hoshiki nokadai
[Reconsidering Bidding and Contracting Methods of Public Works], 27 KAIKEI KENSA
KENKYU 159, 162.
58. See, e.g., Kusunoki, supra note 35, at 17.
59. See Ohno, supra note 57, at 161; Kusunoki, supra note 35, at 14–15. This idea
is very controversial. Some commentators may insist that the more intense the competition, the higher the quality of the items and works the successful candidates will
supply.
60. See, e.g., BRIAN WOODALL, JAPAN UNDER CONSTRUCTION: CORRUPTION,
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC WORKS 38 (1996).
61. Id. at 39–41.
62. Id. at 27.
63. Id. at 39–41.

2007]

GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT

533

Criticisms of this problem have grown louder since a number of infamous bid-rigging and bribery cases, including one involving then
Construction Minister Kishiro Nakamura and Kajima Corporation, the
largest construction company in Japan, triggered the public’s anger in
the 1990s. 64 Designated competitive tendering then became a target of
criticism as a hotbed of unjust activities. 65 Almost simultaneously, the
sanction regime and the enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Act were
strengthened. 66 Furthermore, most national and some local administrative agencies started to treat open competitive tendering as the general
rule for procurement to implement the WTO-GPA after it came into
force in 1996. 67
The price-only competition method was, however, left as the general
rule. 68 Public works is one of the fields most disadvantaged by this.
Coupled with the long-term recession and the drastic curtailment of the
public project budgets throughout the 1990s, 69 the change to open
competitive bidding forced civil engineering and construction companies to compete much harder than before and this increased competition led to dumping. As a result, there have been many cases where the
contract price was much lower than the estimated price that had been
deemed to be reasonable. 70

64. A. Didrick Castberg, Prosecutorial Independence in Japan, 16 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 38, 83–84 (1997). Nakamura was alleged to have received a bribe of ten
million yen from Kiyoyama Shinji, a vice president of Kajima, in exchange “for
Nakamura’s convincing the [Japanese] Fair Trade Commission [JFTC] not to pursue
collusion charges against a cartel of construction firms in Saitama prefecture.” Id. at
83; see also WOODALL, supra note 60, at 126.
65. Kokyokōji hōritsu mamori tomei ni [Compliance and Transparency in Public
Projects], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Jul. 16, 2000 (Morning Ed.), at 18.
66. See, e.g., Shigeki Kusunoki, Shaping an Anti-Monopoly Law Sanction Regime
Against Cartels or Bid Collusion: A Perspective on Japan’s Choice, 79 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 399 (2002).
67. Until the end of the last century, however, the speed of the reforms was slow.
68. There has not been any change to AA article 29(6)(1) which provides that the
price-only competition method is a general rule. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(6)(1).
69. The Junichiro Koizumi administration (2001–06) has been based on the concept of “a small government.” This concept has been the engine to budget curtailment.
See, e.g., Haruki Sasamori, Shift to Small Govt Accelerates, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Dec.
28, 2005, at 4.
70. In January 2007, the Fair Trade Commission started an investigation and an
analysis of the situation concerning unreasonably low bidding. See Koutori teikakaku
nyusatsu de sujyussha chosa [The FTC Investigates Dozens of Enterprises for Unreasonable Low Bidding], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Jan. 5, 2007 (Evening Ed.), at 18.
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III. NEW LEGISLATION ON PUBLIC WORKS: THE ACT FOR PROMOTING
QUALITY ASSURANCE IN PUBLIC WORKS (APQA)
A. Background of the Legislation 71
In response to the cries of construction companies in the wake of intense competition, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the ruling
party for a long time after WWII, started to move to address their
hardships. 72 In June 2003, the LDP launched an internal survey and a
study group on the issue.
In the same month, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)
launched “The Study Group Concerning Public Procurement and
Competition Policy,” which aimed to suggest new schemes and practices to deter bid rigging and maximize “value for money.” 73 The
recommendations of the study group’s report published in November
2003 include “the positive active use of the comprehensive evaluation
method” and “the introduction of the competitive dialogue method,” 74
both later incorporated into the provisions of the APQA.
The JFTC’s report published simultaneously suggested that amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Act was needed to strengthen the sanctions
against various types of misconduct. 75 This added fuel to the LDP
members’ sense of an impending crisis because they thought the
stricter sanctions would lead to an increase in dumping by construction
71. Information about the background and legislative history of the APQA can
generally be found only in specialized newspapers written in Japanese.
72. The construction industry is one of the LDP’s important money pipelines and
one of its power bases. See WOODALL, supra note 60, ch. 3.
73. For a discussion of the basic concept and understanding of “value for money,”
see U.K. NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE (NAO) & OFFICE OF GOV’T COMMERCE (OGC), GETTING
VALUE FOR MONEY FROM PROCUREMENT: HOW AUDITORS CAN HELP, available at,
http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Value_for_Money_(VFM)_in_Procurement_-_Th
e_Role_of_Auditors.pdf. This report explains that value for money “is defined as the
optimum combination of whole life costs and quality.” Id. at 3. Guidelines for implementation of the value for money policy in the United Kingdom are set out in HER
MAJESTY’S TREASURY, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING 2000, ch. 22 (as amended) (U.K.),
available at http://www.government-accounting.gov.uk/current/frames.htm (click
“Contents”; then scroll down left side of page for link to ch. 22).
74. JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE WORKSHOP REGARDING PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT
AND
COMPETITION
POLICY,
available
at
http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/03.november/03111801.pdf.
75. JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE
ANTIMONOPOLY ACT, PART 1: COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
(Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/reports/survey/2003/1.pdf;
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/reports/survey/2003/2.pdf; http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/
reports/survey/2003/3.pdf (English “tentative” translations of Nov. 21, 2003).
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companies. The LDP therefore rushed to enact new legislation on public works.
In autumn 2004, Diet 76 members introduced a bill to enact the
APQA at the same time the Cabinet submitted a bill to amend the
Anti-Monopoly Act. The former was enacted three weeks after the latter in spring 2005. 77
B. Introduction to the Contents of the APQA
1. Purpose
Article 1 of the APQA states that its purpose is to “set[] forth a basic
philosophy for ensuring the quality of public works in order to clarify
the responsibilities of the central government and other stakeholders”
and “basic policies to promote quality in public works in order to improve the public welfare and contribute to the sound development of
the national economy.” 78
2. Definition of “Public Works”
Article 2 provides that the “public works” that are covered by the
APQA are “as defined in Article 2.2 of the Act for Promoting Proper
Tendering and Contracting for Public Works.” 79
3. Basic Philosophy
Article 3 of the APQA describes the basic philosophy of the Act as
follows:
1. In that public works, providing social capital that supports the
well-being and economic activities of the public, have important
socioeconomic implications, the central and local governments, as
well as other entities that place and receive orders for public works,
76. “The Diet” in Japan, which is composed of the House of Representatives and
the House of Councilors, is equivalent to the Parliament in the United Kingdom.
77. Law No. 35, 2005. The APQA came into force on April 1, only one day after
the bill was passed. APQA, supra note 9, art. 1, appx.
78. Id. art. 1, translated in Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transp., Bill for
Ensuring
the
Quality
of
Public
Works,
http://www.hrr.mlit.go.jp/gijyutu/hinkaku/html/hou-english.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2007). All subsequent citations to the APQA are to this English translation.
79. Id. art. 2; see Kokyokōji no nyusatsu oyobi keiyaku no tekiseika no sokushin ni
kansuru hōritsu [Act for Promoting Proper Tendering and Contracting for Public
Works], Law No. 127 of 2000, art. 2(2) (“[I]n this Act, ‘public works’ means construction works ordered by the central government, the semi-governmental special
corporations and the local governments.”).
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should ensure the quality of public works for present and future
generations of the Japanese people in fulfilling their respective roles.
2. In that construction work has such unique characteristics as that its
quality can be confirmed only after structures are provided for use, its
quality depends to a great degree upon the technological capabilities
of contractors, and its conditions differ significantly between individual projects, various factors in addition to price should be considered to ensure the quality of public works; due consideration
should also be given to economic efficiency, resulting in the conclusion of contracts that comprehensively consider pricing and
quality.
3. In that work efficiency, safety, environmental impact and other
factors are important considerations in ensuring the quality of public
works, quality assurance should employ the most appropriate technologies available.
4. To ensure the quality of public works, due attention should be
given to ensuring the transparency of tendering and contracting
processes and the content of contracts, the fairness of competition for
contracts, the removal of construction companies that are not qualified as contractors, the elimination of improper activities such as
collusion and bid-rigging, and the use of proper construction practices.
5. To ensure the quality of public works, due consideration should be
given to the private companies employed in public works projects,
including the proper evaluation of their capabilities; the proper reflection of these capabilities in tendering and contracting; and the use
of their technical proposals (herein meaning proposals on technology
utilization submitted for public works contracts to be awarded
competitively), originality, and ingenuity.
6. To ensure the quality of public works, due attention should be
given to the conclusion of fair contracts based on agreements between parties negotiating on an equal footing, and to the good-faith
implementation of these contracts.
7. To ensure the quality of public works, the quality of surveys on and
designs for public works shall be ensured in accordance with the
principles set forth in the preceding paragraphs, in that the quality of
such surveys and designs significantly affect the quality of public
works. 80

80. APQA, supra note 9, art. 3.
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4. Responsibilities
Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the APQA provide for the responsibilities of
the national and local governments, procuring entities, and contractors.
Article 4 provides that the national government “shall assume responsibility for formulating and implementing comprehensive measures to
ensure the quality of public works.” 81 Article 5 commands the local
governments to assume the same responsibility “in cooperation with
the central government, while giving due consideration to local
needs.” 82 Article 6 provides that the procuring entities “shall properly
perform . . . the production of written specifications, evaluation of
prices, determination of tendering and contracting methods, selection
of the contractor, supervision and inspection of work, and confirmation
and evaluation of the progress of construction during the work period
and at the time of completion.” 83 Finally, Article 7 requires public
works contractors to perform their work “pursuant to the basic philosophy, and shall improve their technological capabilities to that
end.” 84
5. Basic Principles
Articles 8, 9, and 10 provide for basic principles and responsibilities
pursuant thereto to be established by the national government. Article
8 directs the national government to set forth, and then give public notice of, “basic principles for the comprehensive implementation of
measures to ensure the quality of public works,” giving “consideration
to the autonomy of quasi-governmental agencies . . . and of local governments.” 85 Article 9 prescribes the obligation of the heads of ministries and agencies, heads and representatives of quasi-governmental
and independent administrative agencies, and local government heads
to “implement necessary measures to promote the quality of public
works in accordance with basic principles.” 86 Finally, Article 10 provides that the national government “shall establish systematic cooperation between concerned administrative organizations” in formulating
and implementing the basic principles. 87

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
APQA, supra note 9, art. 8.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 10.
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6. Evaluation of the Technical Capabilities of Bidding Participants and
Technical Proposals
Articles 11 through 13 are provisions concerning the evaluation of
the technical capabilities of and technical proposals from the participants in competitive bidding for public works contracts. First, Article
11 requires procuring entities to review the capabilities of candidates,
“including their experience in constructing public works, their past
construction experience and the expertise of the[ir] engineers.” 88 Next,
Article 12 requires procuring entities generally to request that candidates submit technical proposals, and in cases where technical proposals are requested, the entities “shall give public notice of both the request and the method of evaluating proposals in advance;” “shall
properly examine and evaluate” the proposals, “implement[ing] measures to ensure . . . neutrality and fairness,” including complaint resolution measures; and generally “shall subsequently make public the results of their evaluations.” 89 Finally, Article 13 prescribes the dialogue
method for improvement of technical proposals. Specifically, it states
that a procuring entity may request contractors to improve submitted
proposals or give them the opportunity to do so, and, in such a case,
the procuring entity shall “provide an overview of the technical proposal improvement process.” 90 This latter provision is meant to keep
the process of technical proposal improvement transparent.
7. Ex Post Facto Determination of a Maximum Estimated Price
Article 14 of the APQA provides for the ex post facto determination
of a maximum estimated price following evaluation of technical proposals. Specifically, in a case where a procuring entity “request[s]
technical proposals that involve advanced technologies,” it may set a
cap on the estimated price “based on the results of its evaluations of
proposals.” 91 Moreover, “[i]n examining technical proposals,” the
procuring entity is obligated to “seek the opinions of knowledgeable
persons who can offer fair judgments from a neutral position.” 92
8. Assistance from Other People and Organizations
Procuring entities need sufficient administrative skills and experience to handle bidding procedures in order to carry out public works
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. art. 11.
Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 13.
Id. art. 14.
APQA, supra note 9, art. 14.
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properly. In cases where the contents of works are highly specialized
and complicated techniques are needed, however, many procuring entities, especially those of local governments, do not have sufficient
skills. Article 15 of the APQA therefore provides that the procuring
entities are obligated to entrust performance of their duties to other
people or organizations that have sufficient skills and experience. 93
C. Significance and Impact of the New Act
1. Comprehensive Evaluation Not to Be an Exception in Public
Works
Under the APQA, the comprehensive evaluation method will be used
more often than before, in place of the price-only competition method,
which has been used on a regular basis. As the quotation of Article
3(2) above indicates, this provision of the Act provides that various
factors in addition to price should be considered to ensure the quality
of public works. 94
It is said that the LDP inserted the vague expression “various factors
in addition to price” into this article because it wanted to weaken
pressure from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party, in order to speed up passage of the legislation. The dominant opinion of the members of the DPJ—a party which depends heavily on the support of local and small-sized enterprises—was that “quality” should be defined to include various factors such as contributions
to local events, contributions to charities, and contributions to disaster
measures. 95 These are all activities that local and small-sized enterprises actively pursue in their home areas. As a result, it is uncertain
exactly how comprehensive the comprehensive evaluation method will
actually turn out to be in practice.
2. Dialogue Method
Article 13 of the APQA, which, as explained above, provides for a
method of dialogue between a candidate and a procuring entity to improve a submitted technical proposal, can be said to be the core of the
Act. Under the Accounting Act, the Local Autonomy Act, and related

93. Id. art. 15(1)–(3).
94. Id. art. 3(2).
95. There are many criticisms of this vagueness. See, e.g., Tarou Sawaki, Hinkakuho eno aru huan [Uneasiness About the Act for Promoting Quality Assurance in
Public Works], 54 (4) CE (CIVIL ENGINEERING) 33 (2005) (explaining the main text’s
story between the LDP and the DPJ).

540

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 32:2

orders, the holding of a dialogue between the time of notice and that of
bidding are neither permitted nor prohibited in competitive tendering
procedures. 96 Article 13, however, encourages and can be used as justification for the use of the dialogue method by clearly describing the
process for dialogue between a candidate and a procuring entity to improve a submitted technical proposal prior to the bidding date.
One potential problem is arbitrariness on the part of procuring entities in cases where the dialogue method is used. In this regard, Article
13 makes it obligatory for procuring entities to make public an overview of the process for improvement of technical proposals. The
APQA, however, does not provide any further details.
3. Estimated Price: Ex Post Facto Determination
The method of determining estimated prices was drastically changed
by Article 14, which provides that a procuring entity “may cap estimates based on the results of its evaluations of proposals” in cases
where it requests “technical proposals that involve advanced technologies.” 97 In such cases, the time of determination is expected to be several days prior to the day of bidding. 98 Generally, estimated prices are
determined at the stage of the procurement notice. As to such prices,
the Order Concerning Budget, Auditing and Accounting requires the
entity to estimate price “on the basis of the specifications and the design documents” and related factors concerning the item, and to “keep
the document in which this estimated price is written or recorded at the
time when submitted bids are opened.” 99 If there is a very large informational gap concerning the technical proposals between the procuring
entity and candidates and if the need for dialogue to improve the submitted proposals is very strong, this means that the procuring entity
lacks sufficient data to determine the estimated price and it cannot
make such a determination in advance. In such a situation, an ex post
facto determination of the estimated price is inevitable.

96. See AA, supra note 14, art. 29(1)–(12) (ch. 4); Local Autonomy Act, supra
note 16, ch. 9, § 6; OBAA, supra note 15, arts. 68–102 (ch. 7); Order Concerning
Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act, supra note 17, ch. 5, § 6. There is no provision concerning “negotiation” in the competitive bidding procedures. Indeed, a few
procuring entities had used the dialogue method before the APQA came into force.
97. APQA, supra note 9, art. 14.
98. In one previous case, the estimated price was determined four days before the
day of bidding.
99. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 79.
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4. Monitoring and Bid Protests
To assure the quality of public works, it seems appropriate to adopt a
flexible system of procurement methods. The greater the number of
various methods available, however, the more important the procedures for monitoring procuring entities become. In competitive tendering, where price is the sole evaluated item, there are no serious
problems because the successful bidders are determined automatically
based only on the prices that they submit. In competitive tendering
where the comprehensive evaluation method is adopted—especially in
cases where candidates submit technical proposals, they and the procuring entities hold discussions, and the estimated price is determined
ex post facto—the need for monitoring procuring entities increases and
the techniques for undertaking such monitoring are complicated. In
Japan, third-party institutions like the Committee for the Oversight of
Bidding, which consists of part-time members including lawyers,
scholars, and journalists, tend to be emphasized.
Moreover, it is expected that the more varied and flexible the procuring methods are, the greater the number of unsuccessful candidates
who will make complaints. 100 Unsuccessful candidates are supposed to
be the most effective monitoring parties because they are the most interested parties who are close to the procuring entities. Therefore, establishment of sufficient and effective bid-protest procedures is one of
the most urgent tasks in government procurement regimes.
Neither a monitoring scheme nor a bid-protest scheme is addressed
in the APQA. Only the supplementary resolutions for the bill by the
respective committees on Land and Transport in the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors deal with these matters, providing in identical language that one of the objectives of the measures
the government should implement to enforce the law is “[t]o properly
reflect the opinions of third parties such as knowledgeable persons regarding the tendering and contracting process for public works, and to
properly handle complaints from concerned parties, including the enactment of legislation where necessary.” 101
To implement the WTO-GPA, in 1995 Japan established the Office
for the Government Procurement Challenge System (CHANS) to deal
100. As the author mentions later, there is the marked tendency in the Japanese
community for people to think that “a dispute is best avoided.” Therefore, the author
has reservations concerning the effectiveness of any bid-protest scheme that is established.
101. Resolution on the Bill for Quality Assurance of Public Works art. 2 (as drafted
by the House of Councilors, Comm. on Land & Transp. (Diet), Mar. 29, 2005) (Japan),
available at http://www.cgr.mlit.go.jp/hinkaku/qoality_050412_e.htm.
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with bid protests involving national procuring entities. However, this
system had seldom been used as of July 2006. 102 This is probably due
to the Japanese anti-competitive and cooperative mindset ingrained in
the domestic construction and civil engineering industries. The examining committee in this system (the Government Procurement Review
Board), like the Committee for the Oversight of Bidding, is a
third-party institution consisting of part-time members. 103 Moreover,
as of the same date, few local governments had established bid-protest
procedures. 104
D. Practical Responses
Generally speaking, as of July 2006, most government agencies had
not yet sufficiently prepared for the enforcement of the APQA. 105 In
August 2005, the Cabinet endorsed the basic principles provided in
Article 8 of the Act. 106 The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
Transport (MLIT) then published guidelines concerning the enforcement of the Act in September 2005. 107 Regional branches of the MLIT,
other national agencies, and local governments are currently considering or beginning to undertake measures to implement the Act.

102. Cabinet Office, Office for Gov’t Procurement Challenge Sys., Public Release
of Status of Receipt and Review of Complaints (Japan), available at
http://www5.cao.go.jp/access/english/chans_main_e.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007)
(follow “Public Release of Status of Receipt and Review of Complaints” hyperlink).
103. See Cabinet Office, Government Procurement Review Board Members (Japan), http://www5.cao.go.jp/access/english/chans/chans-member-e.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2007).
104. Due to time and space limitations, this article does not address the subject of
legal review because the author believes that it would be very complicated to organize
and examine country and regional regulations and practices for a comparative analysis
of the United States, the European Union, and Japan. The author of course recognizes
the importance of this matter.
105. See, e.g., Interview by Kensetsu Kogyo Shimbun with Masashi Waki, Member
of the Diet (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.waki-m.jp/column/column060217
.html.
OFFICE,
GUIDELINES
(2005),
available
at
106. See
CABINET
http://www.skr.mlit.go.jp/etc/hinkaku/pdf/7.pdf.
107. MINISTRY OF LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSP., GUIDELINES CONCERNING
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT FOR PROMOTING QUALITY IN PUBLIC WORKS (2005),
available at http://www.mlit.go.jp/tec/nyuusatu/keiyaku/170930/01.pdf.
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IV. JAPAN VIS-À-VIS THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION,
AND THE WTO-GPA
This Part analyzes the Japanese laws in comparison with the corresponding U.S. 108 and E.U. laws 109 (in part E.U. member states’
laws) 110 and points out the hurdles that Japan must overcome to implement the WTO-GPA fully.
A. Comparison with the United States and the European Union
1. Contractor Award Process
With regard to the contractor award process, a notable characteristic
of the relevant Japanese laws is that the comprehensive evaluation
108. The U.S. federal procurement regimes consist of the Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2202, 2301–14, 2381, 2383 (2006), and the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-152, 63 Stat. 377
(codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 251–53d, 253f–54, 254b–66a (2006) and scattered sections of other titles, especially 40 U.S.C.), which generally regulate procurement processes; the Buy American Act, 47 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at 41
U.S.C. §§ 10a–10d and scattered sections of other titles), which obligates procuring
agencies to purchase U.S. domestic products; the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601–13, 5 U.S.C. §
5108, and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), which provides procedures for resolution of
disputes; and the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, Div. B,
Title VII, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551–56, 41 U.S.C. §§
253a–53b (2006), and in scattered sections of other titles) which aims at assuring
competitiveness in public contracts. Pursuant to these acts, the General Services
Agency, the Department of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) jointly established the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48
C.F.R. pts. 1–53 (2006), which broadly regulates the whole of the federal procurement
processes including bid protests (FAR part 33). See W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL chs. 1, 33 (4th ed. 2004).
109. Public procurement in the member states of the European Union is regulated by
the member states’ respective laws and regulations. These must be consistent with any
E.U. directive adopted and promulgated by the Council of the European Union. See
Treaty Establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version), Dec. 24,
2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, art. 249. The currently valid directive concerning the
award of public works, supply, and service contracts, which applies to the awarding of
contracts equal to or greater than a certain amount, is European Parliament and
Council Directive 2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114. See European Commission,
Public Procurement Legislation: New Directives (Legislative Package),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/legislation_en.htm#current
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007). See generally CHRISTOPHER BOVIS, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005).
110. For a comparative analysis of the U.S. and E.U. regimes, see Jean-Jacques
Verdeaux, Public Procurement in the European Union and in the United States: A
Comparative Study, 32 PUB. CONT. L. J. 713 (2003).
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method has not been adopted as the general rule for either national or
local government procurement. 111 Prior to the enactment of the APQA,
this was true even for items where sophisticated techniques were
needed in public works, such as in airport or dam construction. Procuring entities have generally dealt with problems concerning quality
or techniques not by adoption of the comprehensive evaluation method
but instead by use of designated competitive tendering. 112 Though the
law provides that designated competitive tendering may be adopted
exceptionally, in practice the reverse has continued for a long time. 113
As previously pointed out, one basis for the APQA’s enactment was the
increasing difficulty in excluding incompetent contractors from public
procurements through “designation” because designated competitive
tendering was considered to be a vice as a result of the aforementioned
Nakamura and other bid-rigging and bribery scandals that broke out in
the 1990s. 114 Therefore, procuring entities became obligated to use
open competitive tendering as the rule and this has led to cut-throat
competition among candidates. 115
As a result of the enactment of the APQA, the basic contractor award
procedure for public works in Japan changed from the combination of
“designated competitive tendering with a price-only evaluation
method” to “open competitive tendering with a comprehensive evaluation method.” As will be shown, this change has brought Japanese law
more in line with U.S. law and practice. It must be remembered, however, that this change in Japanese procedure currently affects only public works, due to the limited applicability of the APQA.
Unlike in Japan, neither U.S. nor E.U. law differentiate between the
procedure for government procurement of public works and that for
other types of items or works. In the United States, the generally used
“full and open competition” procedure, equivalent to the primary procedure of “open competitive tendering” in Japan, uses two types of
evaluation methods, namely, the “sealed bidding” method, 116 in which
the contract is awarded to the bidder with the lowest price, 117 and the
111. In the last few years, only the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
has tried to use the comprehensive evaluation method on a regular basis. As a whole,
however, this method is exceptionally used.
112. About use of designated competitive tendering in order to maintain quality of
public works, see supra Part II.E.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See supra Part III.A.
116. 48 C.F.R. pt. 14 (2006).
117. Under sealed bidding, contracts are awarded “to that responsible bidder whose
bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to the Govern-
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“competitive proposal” method, 118 in which the candidate presenting
the proposal “that represents the best value” is awarded the contract. 119
Sealed bidding may be used only in cases where certain conditions are
met. 120 In the European Union, on the other hand, combinations of the
“open procedure with a price-only evaluation method,” the “restrictive
procedure with a price-only evaluation method,” the “open procedure
with a comprehensive evaluation method,” or the “restrictive procedure with a comprehensive evaluation method” may be used on a
case-by-case basis. 121 The European Union’s “open procedure” and
“restrictive procedure” are equivalent, respectively, to open competitive tendering and designated competitive tendering in Japan. Among
the four methods, there is no designation as to which should be used as
a general rule and which should be used as an exception. 122
Another important development in the Japanese public procurement
regimes, discussed previously, is that the APQA permits the use of
dialogue in both types of competitive tendering procedures. 123 This
may be understood as an approach similar to the U.S. regimes.
Namely, under U.S. law, both the “full and open competition” and
ment, considering only price and the price-related factors included in the invitation.”
48 C.F.R. § 14.101(e) (2006). The price-related factors that may be applicable and
would therefore be included in a bid solicitation are listed at 48 C.F.R. § 14.201-8
(2006).
118. 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.401(b), pt. 15 (2006).
119. 48 C.F.R. § 15.302 (2006); see 48 C.F.R. § 15.304 (2006) (describing the
factors and “significant subfactors” of evaluation of a proposal).
120. 48 C.F.R. § 6.401(a) (2006). This subpart provides:
“Contracting officers shall solicit sealed bids” if the four following
conditions are met:
(1) Time permits the solicitation, submission, and evaluation of sealed bids,
(2) The award will be made on the basis of price and other price-related
factors,
(3) It is not necessary to conduct discussions with the responding offerors
about their bids, and
(4) There is a reasonable expectation of receiving more than one sealed bid.
Id.
121. In practice, the member states might treat the open procedure as a general rule
and the restrictive procedure as an exception or vice-versa.
122. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134)
114 arts. 28, 53. However, this does not mean the laws and regulations of all member
states that implement the Directive distinguish between the rule and the exception(s)
on this point.
123. See APQA, supra note 9, art. 13.
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“full and open competition after exclusion of sources” 124 procedures
allow the use of the competitive proposal method in which negotiation 125 between the procuring entity and candidates is expected. 126 In
the European Union, neither the open procedure nor the restricted procedure inherently anticipate negotiation. Instead, the “competitive dialogue” method in which procuring entities negotiate with candidates in
a competitive environment was introduced by a new directive issued in
2004. 127
To the extent that a method by which a procuring entity and a candidate can hold discussions as part of a competitive procedure exists in
public procurement law, however, the United States, the European
Union, and Japan currently concur.
2. Maximum Estimated Price and Reasonable Price
Among the United States, the European Union, and Japan, the concept of capping the estimate for a contract price in public procurement
exists only in Japan. 128 The Japanese public procurement regimes are
therefore special in this respect. Although in a given case in the United
States the procuring entity calculates a price it deems reasonable in
light of the specifications of the targeted items and unit prices of mate124. It should be noted that in the United States, procuring agencies designate
certain entities that are excluded from the award competition, not those that may
participate in it. On the other hand, as mentioned in the text accompanying note 123,
Japanese designated competitive bidding is similar to the restrictive procedure of the
European Union.
125. “Negotiation” means “a procedure that includes the receipt of proposals from
offerors, permits bargaining, and usually affords offerors an opportunity to revise their
offers before award of a contract.” KEYES, supra note 108, at 269. The FAR provides
that “[b]argaining includes persuasion, alteration of assumptions and positions,
give-and-take, and may apply to price, schedule, technical requirements, type of
contract, or other terms of a proposed contract.” 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(d) (2006).
126. See 48 C.F.R. pt. 15 (“Contracting by Negotiation”).
127. Article 29 of European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC provides
the process for the competitive dialogue. European Parliament and Council Directive
2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114 art. 29. The Directive defines “competitive dialogue” as:
a procedure in which any economic operator may request to participate and
whereby the contracting authority conducts a dialogue with the candidates
admitted to that procedure, with the aim of developing one or more suitable
alternatives capable of meeting its requirements, and on the basis of which
the candidates chosen are invited to tender.
Id. art. 1(11)(c).
128. See supra Part II.C.
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rials, this price is the standard of suitability, not the upper limit. 129 If
the price offered by the most advantageous candidate exceeds this reasonable price, the procuring entity then examines whether this price is
still within the reasonable range. 130
Since, as aforementioned, procuring entities may dialogue with candidates to enable them to improve their proposed techniques pursuant
to the APQA, it does not make sense to set the estimated price at the
time of the invitation notice. The Act permits the estimated price to be
set after holding discussions, 131 thereby rendering the estimated price
extremely flexible, and procuring entities may consider many complicated factors in addition to budgetary restrictions when determining a
suitable estimated price.
3. Secondary Policies
Secondary policies (policies other than those based on economic
reasonableness) are commonly considered in public procurement law
and practice around the world. In the United States, policies of protection of small and medium-sized enterprises and creation of jobs are
reflected in several public procurement laws which provide special
budgets for certain projects, 132 using the “full and open competition
after exclu[sion of] . . . sources” procedure. 133 For example, the Small
Business Act 134 establishes a program that authorizes the Small
Business Administration to enter into contracts with other agencies and
thereafter subcontract their performance to firms eligible for program

129. As to the United States, see 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-1(b) (2006). European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC mentions neither the reasonable price nor
the upper limit.
130. See 48 C.F.R. § 14.404-2(f) (2006) (“Any bid may be rejected if the contracting
officer determines in writing that it is unreasonable as to price.”); see also 48 C.F.R. §
14.408-2(a) (“The contracting officer shall determine . . . that the prices offered are
reasonable before awarding the contract.”).
131. See APQA, supra note 9, art. 14.
132. 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.203–6.205 (2006).
133. 48 C.F.R. § 6.200 (2006).
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631–57f (2006).
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participation 135 based on different considerations than the usual “most
favorable offer” evaluation standard. 136
The E.U. directive does not contain any provisions concerning secondary policies; instead, the matter is left up to the member states.
Generally speaking, member states’ national laws tend to support small
and medium-sized enterprises and entities which usually must compete
with large enterprises and entities at a disadvantage. In Germany, the
Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) 137 provides that “[t]he interests of small and medium-sized undertakings shall primarily be taken into account in an
appropriate manner by subdividing contracts into trade-specific and
partial lots.” 138 In France, the Code of Public Contracts (Le Code des
Marchés Publics) provides that “[i]n the event of identical prices or
equivalent bids for a contract, a preferential right is granted to bids
submitted by a workers’ production cooperative, an agricultural producers’ group, a craftsman, a craftsmen’s cooperative society or an
artists’ cooperative society or an adapted company.” 139 It appears to
the author that concerns for secondary policies are not involved in the
“most economically advantageous” evaluation standard. 140
In applying the guidelines drafted pursuant to the Public Agency
Order Act, government procuring entities in Japan, as in the European
Union, tend to carry out secondary policies through specially designed
entity-specific programs. In addition, certain projects are designated
for award to small and medium-sized enterprises only. This system is
abstractly similar to the aforementioned U.S. “full and open competi135. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2006); see 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.204, 19.800 (2006). For secondary policies, see the Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act
of 1992, 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006), and the HUBZone Act of 1997, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631
note, 657a (2006).
136. It is much different at the E.U. member state level. In the famous
Burma/Massachusetts dispute, a secondary policy concern (political commitment) was
included in the award criteria. See ARROWSMITH, supra note 1, at 343.
137. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Act Against Restraints of Competition], June 27, 1957, BGBl. I 1081, July 12, 2005, BGBl. I 1954, available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf [hereinafter GWB]. An English translation of this law is available at the government Web site,
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/06_GWB_7__Novelle_e.p
df.
138. GWB, supra note 137, art. 97(3) (English translation).
139. C. MARCHÉS PUB., art. 54(I) (Fr.) (English translation, Legifrance (government) Web site, http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=28&r=1411 (last
visited Jan. 28, 2007)).
140. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134)
114 art. 53(1)(a).
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tion after exclusion of sources.” As pointed out above, the frequency of
the use of the designated competitive tendering procedure has decreased significantly in recent times. Carrying out secondary policies
through designation has therefore become difficult. To counter this in
the future, the author believes that the language of the relevant laws
and regulations can be interpreted to include secondary policy concerns as part of the comprehensive evaluation standard. Indeed, the
APQA provides that “various factors in addition to price should be
considered to ensure the quality of public works” 141 and the interpretation of the vague term “various factors” has not yet been made clear.
The interpretation is likely to be influenced heavily by future practices.
It cannot be denied that the APQA could bypass secondary policies,
but one should remember that the Public Agency Order Act still exists.
If concerns of secondary policies are included in the factors to be taken
into account under the comprehensive evaluation method, Japan would
be much different from the United States and the European Union with
respect to this point.
4. Monitoring and Bid Protests
The more complicated the evaluation process to award contracts, the
stronger the need to monitor procuring entities. Furthermore, the need
to provide procedural protection of losing candidates to appeal, i.e., to
make a bid protest, is also stronger. Although the APQA opened the
door for flexibility and complexity in public works procurement, the
necessary complementary monitoring and bid-protest mechanisms
have not yet been sufficiently established. As mentioned previously,
the existing monitoring and bid-protest institutions in Japan consist of
part-time outsiders. 142 Whether such institutions work well is doubtful.
Due to the varying national schemes within the European Union,
only a comparison between Japan and the United States is made
here. 143 In the United States, competition advocates 144 and officials of
141. See APQA, supra note 9, art. 3(2).
142. See supra Part III.C.4.
143. The E.U. directive does not make concrete suggestions concerning the monitoring institutions or bid-protest procedures in the member states. The member states
must decide these matters on an individual basis. It is therefore difficult to analyze the
E.U. regimes concerning these matters comparatively with Japan and the United States
because of the inconsistency among the E.U. member states. It should be noted,
however, that there are several interesting points in the E.U. member states concerning
monitoring institutions and bid-protest procedures. For example, in Germany, the
specially-established office for bid protests is part of the Federal Cartel Office
(Bundeskartellamt), equivalent to the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice in the United States, the Competition Director-
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the Offices of the Inspector General of the various government agencies supervise government agency procurement activities. 145 Notably,
the Office of the Inspector General is a body highly independent from
any other government agency, and controlled directly by the President. 146 The officials of the Offices of the Inspector General and competition advocates are the inside government officials. 147 In the United
States, therefore, public entities or officials monitor other public entities or officials. This clearly differs from the state of affairs in Japan. 148
The U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 149 which comprehensively
regulates federal procurement activities in the U.S., devotes an entire
chapter to bid protests. 150 Compared with Japan, it is remarkable that
in the United States not only procuring entities but also the General
Accountability Office, which is responsible for the public accounts,
work as institutions handling bid protests. 151 This means that a public
entity checks another public entity as to bid protests as well as monitoring. In Japan, the Board of Audit, 152 equivalent to the U.S. General
Audit Office, does not play such a role.

ate-General in the European Union, and the Fair Trade Commission in Japan. For
German public procurement review procedures, see GWB, supra note 137, pt. IV, ch.
2 (§§ 102–24).
144. 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.501, 6.502(b).
145. The Inspectors General serve generally to perform audits and investigations of
their respective agencies’ operations and to promote, among other things, economy
and efficiency. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 2, 4 (2006).
146. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(a)–(b) (2006). The position of Inspector General was
established by the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3 (2006).
147. See 48 C.F.R. pt. 6, sec. 5 (2006); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006).
148. To avoid expanding the analysis in this article beyond its intended scope, the
author has intentionally excluded references to court cases involving bid protests as a
comparative analysis of such cases would be very complex. It should be noted that,
because going to court is the last step in making a bid protest, these must not be ignored. The author intends to write another article with a comparative analysis of
bid-protest litigation in the future. Here, the author only points out that the courts
strongly tend to dismiss the claims of unsuccessful candidates in Japan. It might be
interesting to compare the state of affairs respecting this issue in Japan with those of
the U.S. and E.U. countries.
149. 48 C.F.R. pts. 1–53 (2006).
150. 48 C.F.R. pt. 33 (2006).
151. See 48 C.F.R. § 33.104 (2006) (“Protests to GAO”); see also 4 C.F.R. pt. 21
(2007) (“Bid Protest Regulations [GAO]”).
152. The Board of Audit was established by Kaikei kensain ho [Board of Audit
Act], Law No. 73 of 1947.
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B. The Hurdles for Japanese Laws to Implement the WTO-GPA
As far as public works are concerned, the Japanese public procurement regimes have become closer to the framework of the WTO-GPA
since the APQA was enacted. Namely, both open tendering and selective tendering under the WTO-GPA, 153 which respectively correspond
to open competitive tendering and designated competitive tendering in
Japan, permit a dialogue between procuring entities and candidates
similar to the method sanctioned by the APQA in Japan. 154 Additionally, the APQA and the WTO-GPA are in accord on the point that
there is no disproportionate emphasis on price in the contractor award
procedure. 155
Despite some similarities as described above, there are also some
differences between the two. For example, in the WTO-GPA, only
limited tendering 156 is treated as an exception, whereas not only
non-competitive tendering, the equivalent of limited tendering, but also
designated competitive tendering are considered to be exceptions under
the Japanese laws. 157 Furthermore, as aforementioned, the Japanese
regimes include an estimated price system which does not exist under
the WTO-GPA.
This comparison is only a superficial analysis. The more important
matter is how the Japanese regimes work effectively in implementing
the WTO-GPA. The harmonization of the frameworks is merely a tool
for that purpose. There are still major hurdles to be overcome in the
Japanese public procurement regimes, two of which will now be addressed.
The main targets of the WTO-GPA for free and fair international
trade can be said to be: (1) non-discrimination, (2) transparency, and
(3) removal of unnecessary trade restrictions. 158 The APQA should be
complemented by legal rules implementing these targets and their
practices. However, entry barriers can still be set up and procuring entities can still arbitrarily treat certain candidates unfairly even as part
of the flexible and complex processes established pursuant to the
APQA. In fact, the complexity of the processes actually reduces their

153. GPA, supra note 1, art. VII (3)(a), (b).
154. Id. art. XIV.
155. Id. art. XIII(4)(b).
156. Id. art. VII(3)(c) (“Limited tendering procedures are those procedures where
the entity contacts suppliers individually, only under the conditions specified in Article XV [of the GPA].”).
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. ARROWSMITH, supra note 1, at 168–71.
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transparency. To overcome these problems is thought to be the real
target for implementing the WTO-GPA. This is the first hurdle.
A second hurdle is the treatment of secondary policies. As noted
above, it is probable that in the future, secondary policy concerns will
be considered as part of the comprehensive evaluation method. 159 Regarding the WTO-GPA, there has been a debate about the approved
range of secondary policies under Article 23(2). 160 The greater the
importance procuring entities attach to secondary policies, the higher
the trade barriers will be. This causes a conflict with the aims of the
WTO-GPA. Whatever the secondary policies it allows to be considered, the Japanese government must respond sufficiently to the need to
assure transparency concerning practices under the APQA.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Japan is now at the halfway point in undertaking reforms of its government procurement regimes. It is uncertain how the APQA will be
enforced in practice because of its short history since enactment. The
public’s tendency to regard only price as a credible standard even in
the public works field is still deeply rooted in Japanese society. The
possibility that the price-only competition method will continue to be
the primary one used in fields other than public works in the future
cannot be denied.
This article presented a comparative analysis of the relevant legal
provisions in Japan, the United States, and the European Union and
pointed out several matters Japan should keep in mind when implementing the WTO-GPA. Considering its present industrial and social
environments, how will Japan advance toward this goal? A great
number of hurdles must be overcome.

159. See supra pt. III.C.1.
160. ARROWSMITH, supra note 1, at 345–46.

